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Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophy, based on Aristotle and the Judaeo-Christian
tradition, argues for the objective virtues of truth, courage, justice, friendship, and
humility. The aesthete, the therapist, and the manager are, in consequence of
MacIntyre’s ideas, found to be removed from daily life and from virtue. Their
role play further removes them from the good. Because public schools appealing
to a lowest common denominator of values are academically and socially
unsuccessful as compared with those teaching a shared doctrine within a com-
munity, his ideas are particularly relevant. The future educational system will see
schools of choice based on traditional virtue becoming popular among parents.
La philosophie d’Alasdair McIntyre, qui repose sur Aristote et la tradition judéo-
chrétienne, prône les vertus objectives de la vérité, du courage, de la justice, de
l’amitié et de l’humilité. Dans l’esprit de MacIntyre, l’esthète, le thérapeute et le
gestionnaire sont loin de la vie quotidienne et de la vertu. Leur rôle les éloigne
davantage du bien. Comme les écoles publiques qui visent le plus petit dénomi-
nateur commun en matière de vertus échouent sur le plan scolaire et social en
comparaison de celles qui enseignent une doctrine partagée par la communauté,
les idées de MacIntyre sont particulièrement pertinentes. Le système d’éducation
de l’avenir verra des écoles de choix fondées sur les vertus traditionnelles de plus
en plus valorisées par les parents.
INTRODUCTION
Alasdair MacIntyre, a neo-Aristotelian, places his ideas about administration
in the context of traditional thought. A growing intellectual movement,
exemplified by Bloom (1987) and Lasch (1991), sees modernism, expressed
in contemporary liberal thought and policy, as having failed and as requiring
replacement by ideas and policies rooted directly in western traditions and
values. Even Charles Taylor (1989), who seeks to defend the core of modern
thought, expressed as the centrality of personal human authenticity, recog-
nizes the modernist dangers of nihilism, materialism, and excessive concern
with self.
MacIntyre, whose final views may be not too distant from Taylor’s (we
must await Taylor’s next book to see exactly how he reconciles the import-
ance of authenticity with external values and codes, for which he clearly
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sees a need), rejects post-Nietzschean modernism in its entirety, developing
in its place a synthesis of Aristotelian and Judaeo-Christian thought applied
to contemporary times. His ideas are founded in the objective value of the
central virtues of truth, justice, courage, friendship, and humility. He de-
plores the deracinated and vicarious “characters” that connote modernity—
the aesthete, the therapist and, of particular interest here, the manager (a
term synonymous with “administrator” as usually found in education). These
characters are unrooted because they claim no founding virtue to give value
to their moral, aesthetic, and pragmatic judgments; and vicarious because
they live off the substance of everyday life (whether it be artistic creativity,
medicine, industrial production, or schooling) rather than within it.
I here develop MacIntyre’s ideas for application to education.
The Predictability of Human Behaviour
MacIntyre provides four reasons why it is useless to try to predict human
behaviour: invention is unpredictable because to predict it would be to
invent it—yet some inventions have radical (but unpredictable) influence;
contingency is a major factor in human affairs; so-called game theory has
little predictive value—people constantly act out of role, for the simple
reason that the other aspects of life (such as principle, nepotism, envy, or
greed) intervene; and finally, the simple, intrinsic unpredictability of every
human being—each of us is frequently undecided or we change our minds
(1981, pp. 89–96).
Now it will be argued that most of us are creatures of habit. We follow
routines. Moreover, have not social scientists and pollsters shown how
predictable are people’s voting patterns and other, daily behaviours?
Those points MacIntyre would readily concede. It is the so-called science
of human behaviour he denies. Of course, many individuals’ behaviour can
be predicted from behaviour in prior similar circumstances. What is denied
is that one can usefully predict how a group or an individual will react to a
particular proposal in a generalized context. Consider the following example.
In the educational literature, there is considerable discussion about
“empowerment” and “giving people” (usually subordinates) “a sense of
ownership.” The underlying, sometimes concealed, hypothesis goes some-
thing like this: “Subordinates will adopt the behaviour desired by the
superordinate if the superordinate successfully gets them to believe that the
behaviours or the ideas related to the behaviours are their own.” The
apparent science is spurious, because the proposition is impossible to test. If
a principal is unsuccessful with some innovation, it will be explained that
the principal must have implemented the plan badly, because, of course, had
the plan been implemented properly the teachers would have gained a sense
of ownership. It is apparent that one (covert) way in which “empowerment”
and “sense of ownership” are being defined is as synonyms for commitment.
Obviously, if people are committed to something, they are more likely to act
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accordingly than if they are not (that is what commitment means). So what
at first appears to be a scientific pronouncement turns out to be a circular
and misleading argument.
This is not benignly unscientific or openly normative, however; it is
crassly manipulative. The benign words conceal a licence to manipulate
people into believing that the ideas they are implementing are their own, in
order that they will follow the superordinate’s bidding more willingly and
efficiently. Note what would happen were the principal to use the word
commitment in the first place. If it were clearly stated that the new project
required commitment, would not some teachers ask themselves if this was
indeed an idea worthy of their commitment? Would they not wonder if the
project’s principles were consistent with their own? Whether it were likely
to work? So, no mention is made of commitment, or values, or principles.
Rather, “This is a fine new project and we’ve been chosen to pilot it. We
should really give it a try. I know many of you will feel uncomfortable with
it to begin with, because it is new and different. We’re all a bit afraid of
change and don’t feel comfortable with strange and threatening things at
first. Now I’d like you to implement this using your own ideas. I really
value your input. So, Mary, would you chair the committee of junior
teachers? Oh, I’m sure you’ll all want to be involved, and I’ve arranged for
the junior consultant to come in on Friday—it’s a P.D. day—to help you
get started. O.K.? The meeting will be from 9:00 until 11:00” (compare
Holmes, 1991a).
Beneath this shabby surface, there are important philosophical assump-
tions (Lasch, 1991). For many years, change was a key word in school
administration. Perhaps because so many changes turned out to be self-
evidently unsuccessful, the word has gradually been replaced by “improve-
ment.” Who can be opposed to improvement, or to progress? The change
that does not work may be abandoned, or reversed. But lack of complete
success in an improvement project (devoted to progress) cannot, according
to implementors, be attributed to the idea itself; how can progress and
improvement be bad?
Lasch argues that belief in progress is one of the major causes of distress
in modern society. Associated with belief in progress is the assumed virtue
of optimism. The manipulative administrators who empower teachers are not
evil or malicious. They believe what they are doing is for the best, not only
for the students who will benefit from the new improvement (how could one
be harmed by improvement?), but for teachers, empowered by their sense of
“ownership” over the new project. Indeed, the teachers may become innova-
tors themselves, enthusiastically carrying the new idea to another school at
the next P.D. day. But optimism is not a virtue. The idea that somehow
good intentions are enough and that all will turn out for the best as things
get better and better is dangerous. It draws one away from the fundamental
virtues and rests unjustified faith in good intentions. Optimism is no substi-
tute for hope.
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Hope is essential to the human condition. It is sensible to hope that events
over which we have no control, as well as those over which we do have
influence, will turn out for the best. One hopes one’s family will live to old
age and one hopes that friends and relatives will turn away from ill-advised
or immoral ventures. The alternatives to optimism are not pessimism and
cynicism, but hope and realism. Realism should not be identified with
resignation. Some classical and eastern philosophies may appear to or may
in fact advocate resignation, the acceptance of adversity with stoic calm. The
Christian tradition, from which MacIntyre draws, advocates an openness to
life (an idea developed particularly by Jacques Maritain), the importance of
taking opportunities, of accepting the chance vagaries of life—not in blind
optimism, but with courage, faith (in God), and hope.
In time, the innovative administrator’s naive optimism turns to hypocrisy.
When things do not turn out well, perhaps the test results worsen, then,
“The tests do not test what we are now teaching; we must stop using them
because they give parents the wrong impression.” If some teachers revolt, it
is because they are afraid of change and want things the same as when they
were in school, because they don’t understand how things have changed and
how much better they are now than they used to be. From hypocrisy, it is a
small step to dishonesty. The believer in progress, the optimist, often cannot
accept that what has been done may actually be harmful, that things may be
getting worse. Denial leads to dissimulation. An enthusiastic, optimistic
belief in progress based on human expertise cannot accept evidence of
deterioration and human corruption, for that would negate the core belief.
The optimistic belief that children are born good, only to be corrupted by
adults, is attributable to Rousseau; it contrasts with the Christian belief that
we are all sinners, and that children have dispositions to both good and evil.
Are students being attacked in the halls? Well, they always were, but we
hear about it now because they have enough self-esteem to report it. Do
parents complain about the new programs? That shows how open we are to
parents, not as principals used to be. Is there increasing sexual activity
among adolescents and even preadolescents? That is because we are more
open about sexuality and have freed ourselves of the old-fashioned inhibi-
tions. Why, in the old days, pregnant girls just dropped out of sight, so
nobody knew about them. (Apparently they did not even warrant mention in
Statistics Canada’s records of live births and abortions.) Are some teachers
poor models for their students? Well, we would not want to go back to
firing female teachers as soon as they marry. If the schools and modern
society are getting better and better, any apparently negative indicator must,
by necessity, be either false, misleading, or irrelevant.
It is widely accepted that school change projects are very often unsuccess-
ful. Thus, even by the standards of pseudo-scientific science, it makes little
sense to continue to make over teachers in the progressive image, or for that
matter, in the technocratic image (Holmes, 1991a). More fundamentally,
these efforts should cease because they are generally, and not incidentally,
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unethical and immoral; not incidentally, because the corruption stems
directly from the dishonest use of such terms as empowerment, peer collab-
oration, and participatory administration. Even if they are successful, and
one should not completely discount the power of intense propaganda, peer
pressure, and coercive management to bring about superficial change, they
should be first judged in the light of traditional values of truth and integrity.
The Administrator as a Contemporary Character
As already noted, MacIntyre (1981) lists three characters as symbols of
modern times (pp. 71–74). The behaviour of the aesthete, the therapist, and
the administrator is characterized by emotivism. MacIntyre sees emotivism
as a malignant cancer in modern discourse on moral philosophy. Emotivists
identify a non-natural property which they call “good,” but there is no such
property; it is in fact no more than a reflection of their feelings and atti-
tudes. What they propose as “good” is in reality a sketch for empirical,
hypothetical propositions rather than an outcome of a theory of meaning (pp.
16–17). So the contemporary characters base their behaviour on ideas of the
good that are at best sketches of empirical hypotheses.
The characters’ roles are peripheral to moral and productive life. The
aesthete depends on but does not produce art; artistic judgments are made
but there is no founding meaning of good upholding the judgment. It is not
surprising that experts, even more than the public, are so readily hoaxed by
pretentious art, which may be judged legitimately only by those experts
whose standards are both inaccessible and inexplicable to the general public.
The therapist exists to make people “better,” but there is no agreed moral
standard by which “better” can be defined. Indeed, many therapists claim
they must be non-judgmental to be effective; it remains unclear how their
effectiveness can be determined. The administrator is primarily charged with
innovation and improvement. Yet, in education, improvement is often used
to describe a set of vague and unsupported quasi-hypothetical propositions
about the advance of progressivism, whose processes are seen as valuable in
themselves, and sometimes merely to refer to any change the administrators
consider favourable (Holmes, 1991a).
MacIntyre sees a particular danger in the tendency for role and person to
become confused in these modern characters. It is important to understand
the precise nature of this danger, as MacIntyre’s notion of the fusion of role
and personality in a character appears inconsistent with his negative view of
role play, an idea considered later. He opposes both fusion of personality
and role, and the participation in a role.
The danger with the fusion of role and person, in the case of the adminis-
trator, is that the administrator may become the person he or she is,
expected to be at work. The administrator may thus lack or lose the moral
foundation upon which all judgments should be made. For instance, two
Ontario directors of education, interviewed as part of a larger study of the
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role and philosophy of the director, whose philosophies were clearly non-
progressive in nature, agreed that progressive ideas were being imposed in
their elementary schools—and would continue to be even in the face of
hypothetically consensual opposition from the parents, teachers, and princi-
pal in a particular school (Holmes, 1991b).
It may be argued that separation of administrative behaviours from
personal beliefs contradicts MacIntyre’s thesis. MacIntyre would probably
point out that the administrators’ previous (or underlying) beliefs were
marginalized; one director, for example, volunteered as an analogy that he
would consider it quite inappropriate to impose any of his personal religious
beliefs within his work. If one’s religion, central to one’s sense of meaning
in modern life, is inapplicable in one’s work, one may speculate about the
centrality of that religious belief. The role has taken over the person.
The same study found that “strong” religions (followed by Baptists,
Orthodox Jews, traditional Muslims, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and Pentecostals, among others) were entirely unrepresented
among Ontario’s directors. From MacIntyre one would infer that administra-
tors are essentially those whose religious and moral beliefs are either derived
from emotivism, or are so weak as to be fused or marginalized by the
administrative role, or both.
Consider next the fascination of contemporary school administration with
decision making. Leithwood and Montgomery (1986) claim the ideal
principal is primarily a high-level decision maker. Most standard texts on
educational administration (for instance, Hoy & Miskel, 1987) emphasize
“theory” in decision making. A crucial received truth is that administrators
should consult those with stake and expertise before making important
decisions (those lying outside the “zone of acceptance”). It is difficult to tell
whether this belief is emotivism become theory or theory become emotiv-
ism. Certainly, such consultation is considered good by almost all North
American school administrators (whether or not they actually do it—
teachers typically see less true consultation than administrators). The
rationale provided by the texts and by administrators themselves is that
effective decision making requires such consultation. This intellectually
weak mix of positivism and emotivisim is particularly unhelpful for good
administration.
The argument here is not that consultation should not take place. Rather,
it is that the loose combination of weak empiricism and emotivism confuses
instead of sharpening the real issues. Empirically, it certainly makes sense
to consult those who have the clout to block the decision (but clout is
sometimes unrelated to stake and expertise and not always predictable).
There is an empirical issue in decision making; those with expertise may
indeed improve the decision. Those with clout may block it.
But there is also an ethical issue. Under which circumstances ought one
to consult those involved? Because emotivists vaguely see consultation as
good, they need not examine its ethical foundations to determine good. Once
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the good (the very word being leached of moral substance) of consultation
is reduced to the “process” of consulting, it is no wonder that teachers
everywhere complain about empty, manipulative, and insincere consultation.
The process is valued rather than people. In the MacIntyre perspective,
moral commitment to values surrounding the decision is irrelevant—except
insofar as the decision maker believes sincerely in whatever emotivist
principle, be it consultation or cooperative learning, happens to be current.
The administrator accused of insincerity will understandably feel falsely
accused; the administrator does believe sincerely in consultation—and there
is nothing deeper to be sincere about; if there is some vestigial stirring, it is
put aside for Sunday morning.
Role Play
Jane Austen unites Christian and Aristotelian themes and is the “last great
effective imaginative voice of the tradition of thought about, and practice of,
the virtues which I have tried to identify” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 223). It is no
coincidence that Jane Austen is particularly unpopular with high school
English departments, who embrace more eagerly the modernist emotivism of
a Margaret Lawrence or J.D. Salinger.
Fanny, heroine of Mansfield Park, best represents the traditional virtues,
particularly because she lacks the charm of Emma and therefore must stand
by her virtue alone. Patience, constancy, and a refusal to dissimulate are
among her identifying virtues. Central to the novel’s theme is preparation
for a play that takes place in the absence of the household patriarch.
Everything about the play portends disharmony . . . the players squabble selfishly
. . . the house itself is physically disrupted. . . . The actual play . . . turns on
unnatural or dangerous relationships . . . suppressed and dubious desire start to
emerge. . . . Only Fanny stays apart. . . . The others are lost in their roles; blind
behind their masks. (Tanner, 1966, pp. 28–29)
The acceptance or expectation of role play is problematic in the educa-
tional administrator, whose training often includes role-playing sessions.
(The word “training” itself denotes the false claims that empirically justifi-
able generalizations can be made and that the job requires skills more than
wisdom, education, and moral judgment.) The administrator is seen to play
a part, and parts are interchangeable in life as in class or on the stage. This
assumption was nicely illustrated by an administrator in one of my graduate
classes. I began the class by eliciting views on the kinds of changes in
schools wanted by parents and by educators. When the two different lists
were complete, he commented that he accepted both. As a parent he
demanded the parental things from his children’s schools; as an administra-
tor, he tried to convince other parents of the desirability of the other (expert)
list. I have heard analogous comments on several occasions, sometimes to
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the effect that one understands what is being done in the name of ninth-
grade destreaming, but one would not want it for one’s own child. (What is
being done, as the next mandatory change in Ontario, is that grade 9 is
being re-created in the image of an activity-centred grade 1, with the
difference that adolescents are much less likely than young children to
choose to participate in the hard and disciplined task of learning when
alternatives are provided.)
There is no contradiction between MacIntyre’s view that role playing
undermines virtue, and his idea that the contemporary characters (of aes-
thete, therapist, and manager) fuse themselves with their role. MacIntyre is
not arguing that there is some value in the total separation of work from the
rest of life. Quite the contrary: he is a critic of life “after virtue” because
there is no transcendent truth integrating our entire lives. He poses the
choice between Aristotle (and the subsequent Christian tradition) and
Nietzsche, between a core of ethics and a dependence on human will (in the
form of emotivism). The role of the aesthete, the therapist, and the manager,
as typically expressed in contemporary times, is without a substantive moral
core. This relativism (my term) within the role suffuses the individual’s life,
because it is difficult to live an important part of one’s life, involving the
making of significant moral and ethical decisions, while holding the truth (or
good) in abeyance. To hold truth and good in abeyance is to deny their
centrality. It is generally easier to abandon one’s outworn virtue and to
replace it with something more flexible and less inhibiting.
Educational administrators in Ontario, unrepresentative of the total
population as they are, are not clones. They claim different educational
“philosophies,” adhere to various religions, and vote for different political
parties. Yet, when it comes to implementing policy, they nearly all follow
the line laid down by the educational establishment. They work for the
integration of curricula, for inventive spelling, for personal diaries, for whole
language, for the elimination of direct instruction, and for the substitution of
high self-concept (sometimes involving false praise, and the removal of
standards, both moral and intellectual) for the traditional, Christian virtues
of humility, constancy, personal responsibility, diligence, and patience.
Teachers are similarly deprofessionalized. They no longer control their
own methodology, although such control distinguishes a professional from
a technician. They, too, must play the game and adopt a role in which many
do not believe. In the long run, it is easier to become a believer. Role play
and the fusion of person and role are complementary, not opposed. By
playing the role of progressive educator and promoting its emotivist beliefs,
those administrators who were not already true believers in the religion of
progressivism corrupt the religious and other values developed before their
appointment. The virtues, if not entirely abandoned, become tentative, set
aside, certainly not to be imposed on teachers or children; only the “true and
only heaven” of progress is important enough for mandatory imposition.
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Virtue
I have examined three crucial aspects of MacIntyre’s work in application to
school administration: the possibility of a generalizable science of manage-
ment; the administrator as one whose role as administrator, vicarious in
nature, overtakes any other moral foundation; and the importance of role
play in the removal of moral inhibition. Missing from the modernist school
administrator is a grounded belief in virtue.
The immediate response from educational administrators, even those
sympathetic to the argument so far, will be that it is absurd to imagine that
the public school in pluralist, multicultural Canada could possibly contem-
plate an education predicated on virtue. Even MacIntyre would agree. Such
critics fail to comprehend fundamental changes in public school systems of
the western, pluralist world.
THE COMMON SCHOOL IN WESTERN, PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES
I have described elsewhere the overwhelming evidence that the common
school is under attack and may well be obsolete (Holmes, 1988, 1990). An
important distinction is made here between the common school, a genuine
community school representing a microcosm of the larger society, and the
public school, publicly funded and administered.
Briefly, the common school is gradually losing favour in Canada, the
United States, and Britain. The loss of favour has several symptoms—
important among them being the expansion of independent schools, the
expansion of choice within the public sector, and the public’s increasingly
negative attitudes toward public schools. At the same time, necessarily, the
common school is becoming obsolete, not only in Britain, where the ideal
was never firmly entrenched, but in Canada, Australia, and even in the
United States, where its tradition is strongest. It should be redundant to point
out that as variations in program proliferate, the common program of
schooling declines. Unfortunately, defenders of the public school and its
monopolistic control over most education in much of Canada frequently use
the rhetoric of the value of the common school to defend the monopoly’s
control over schools that no longer have even a common program.
The reasons for the fall into disfavour of the public school in general and
the decline of the common school in particular are interwoven and complex.
I shall not attempt detailed analysis. Some forces that lead to, or coexist
with the two trends include:
(i) increasing social, political, philosophical, ethnic, racial, linguistic
diversity, and the associated decline of educational consensus;
(ii) the secularization of public schools, making them less hospitable to
those with strongly held religious beliefs;
(iii) the suspicion, not always founded, and the reality of declining
social order within schools, particularly in urban and suburban settings;
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(iv) the growth of single-interest groups, some successful in changing
one or several schools, thereby alienating other people, others
unsuccessful, with members themselves alienated;
(v) the contest for educational control between educational experts,
wanting child centred education, activity centred classrooms, whole
language, and the elimination of competition, external tests, and
common standards; and the general public, wanting emphasis on the
basic skills, improved discipline, more testing, and more emphasis
on preparation for work or post-secondary education;
(vi) increasing economic segregation of settlement, particularly in urban,
suburban, and exurban areas dominated by subdivisions, and delib-
erately isolated and sometimes self-sufficient housing complexes
and geographical subcommunities;
(vii) the gradual replacement of family and community by the individual
as the unit of societal analysis in educational policy development.
The result of all this is the death of the common school (if death can
come to a body many of whose organs never lived) in the populous regions
of Canada, and its replacement by an assortment of public schools represent-
ing a variety of interests—many related to the social class origin of parents.
Public schools vary by language of instruction, religion, orientation (to the
arts or skilled trades, for example). The approved options vary greatly by
province, but in all provinces there are important exclusions. In Ontario, as
an extreme example, French immersion, schools for gifted children, and
francophone schools and programs proliferate, and the Roman Catholic
system rivals in size the public system in many areas. Yet any teaching of
Protestant Christianity (let alone Judaism or Islam) is prohibited, even on a
voluntary basis over lunch, in any school receiving public funding.
The upshot is that however unlikely a candidate the MacIntyre school is
as a future common school, it is not alone in its inappropriateness; in a time
of pluralism and dissent, there can be no common school, and there is not.
THE SUCCESSFULLY FUNCTIONING SCHOOL
Over the last twenty-five years, as the common school has sunk into obliv-
ion (except in rural areas relatively unaffected by modernity), research on
school effectiveness has shown what produces better academic and social
outcomes (Purkey & Smith, 1983). The concept of school climate is central
to this research, usually operationalized as expectations on the part of both
teachers and fellow-students of hard work and good results.
More recently, research has emphasized two related aspects of effective-
ness. First, there is evidence that the imposition or implementation of
effective school correlates is far from easy, even when the schools involved
volunteer and receive special funding and other assistance (Holmes, 1991c).
Stringfield and Teddlie (1989) claim that “naturally occurring” school
improvement efforts are more likely to succeed than planned improvement.
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Second, Coleman and Hoffer’s (1987) idea of community explains why
some schools are more able than others to develop the correlates of effec-
tiveness. Coleman and Hoffer argue the effectiveness of Catholic schools in
the United States, the lesser effectiveness of elite private schools, and the
comparative ineffectiveness of public schools is due to differences in
community. The Catholic schools are functional communities in that
teachers, students, and parents not only share common values, but live and
work in the same community. In comparison, the values community of the
elite private school represents shared values alone; private-school parents
have little contact with one another outside the school setting. And the
stereotypical large, comprehensive public high school is not a community.
What few binding ties there are, are mechanical (based on role, hierarchy,
policy, collective agreement, and functional division of labour) rather than
organic (based on family, tradition, and segmented division of labour).
Johnson’s findings in the Bahamas (1988) support and add to Coleman’s
thesis. She found that private and Family Island public schools were more
effective than the large urban high schools of Nassau and Grand Bahama.
Within those broad groupings, she discovered distinctions consistent with the
idea that academic achievement is sensitive to the intensity of the doctrine
within the school climate, and to its congruence with the outcomes being
measured. Recent national testing of mathematics in the United States (Why
the Heartland Has Math Smarts, 1992) shows that the most successful states
are such plains states as North Dakota, Montana, and Iowa. Although it is
always dangerous to describe a cause for a complex phenomenon, these
states are least affected by modernity—and are still characterized by com-
munity, social homogeneity, and a strong work ethic. They are also among
the lowest spenders on education.
From the emerging research, I reach three generalizations:
(i) successfully functioning schools (that is, those successfully achiev-
ing legitimate educational goals) are characterized by a climate that
expresses, concretely and symbolically, the significance of those
goals;
(ii) the more intensely the schools represent their doctrine, the more
successful they are;
(iii) the more closely the measures of outcome are related to the
school’s sense of central mission, the better the school will be on
those measures.
Burgeoning research on instructional effectiveness (O’Neill, 1988) shows
that the dominant progressivism (the language of child-centred schools,
collaborative learning, language process, and learning opportunities prevails
in most public Canadian schools) is less effective in teaching basic skills
than are other methods more closely related to traditional values (of truth,
diligence, and personal responsibility). Similarly, Canada’s poor record in
the movement from school to work (an area neglected or disdained by
progressive educators) is underlined by our comparatively high rate of youth
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unemployment—typically twice that of adults, in comparison with Germany,
whose rate of youth unemployment falls well below the adult levels. Claus
(1990) shows how the American segregated vocational centre, part college,
part school, can be vocationally successful and at the same time build at
least what Coleman would call a values community.
There is also general concern in Canada, as in other western, English-
speaking countries, about the discipline and values of young people. Crime,
violence, and pregnancy are important symptoms. There is evidence of a
positive association between a strong, religious family background and
uninvolvement with activities suggesting declining values (Bibby & Poster-
ski, 1983). Yet “functional community” schools (such as the Christian
fundamentalist school described by Peshkin [1987]) are either entirely
unsupported (as in most provinces) or partially funded (in Manitoba, British
Columbia, and Alberta).
The idea of developing MacIntyre-like schools appears less ridiculous
here. MacIntyre’s ideas are rooted in our western cultural, ideological, and
religious inheritance. They stand firmly opposed to the individualism and the
therapeutics characterizing Canada’s dominant progressive education.
Research is beginning to demonstrate their empirical as well as their philo-
sophical value. Finally, his ideas are relevant to the most pressing concerns
of education today—to the lack of purpose and values in so many public
schools, to instructional ineffectiveness, to the value of work and its rel-
evance to education, and to the importance of the religious or spiritual life
of the school.
IMPLICATIONS: THE MACINTYRE SCHOOL AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
The school implied by MacIntyre’s philosophy emphasizes content, sub-
stance, virtue, as distinct from self, the learning environment, and learning
process. It cannot, in a pluralist society, be a common school. Clearly not
everyone shares these values; if they did, progressive extremism would
never have attained the influence that it has. If people had retained adher-
ence to virtue, it would have been impossible for an educational establish-
ment to impose its relativist world view. That is only possible in a society
where maelstrom and vacuum seem equally applicable metaphors for the
state of societal values; schools are in a state of confusion and flux and
competition, but underneath the surface emotivism inevitably lies the spirit
of nihilism. But then, I have argued, there cannot be common schools—and,
in much of Canada, they are few and far between.
The MacIntyre school, then, will be one of choice—but it could turn out
to be the single most popular. It will be criticized for being unicultural—
indeed some Maclntyre schools may be explicitly Judaeo-Christian or
Protestant or Presbyterian; but one should not be surprised if the school that
stands for something more than the doctrine of tolerance, consideration for
others, and non-violence (the lowest common denominator of the stereotyp-
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ical public school) appeals to many of Asian background, who will like its
rigour and emphasis on instruction and discipline; to many of Islamic
background, who will like its emphasis on virtue and its opposition to self
and immediate gratification from play and pleasure; and to many from
traditionally disadvantaged groups, who will be pleased that standards are
not lowered for their children, thereby ensuring their continuing inferiority.
Some schools may be academic, others vocational or technical—but all will
be built on the premise of shared values and purpose—among teachers,
students, parents, and administrators.
The implications for school administrators, and their education and
preparation, are important. Their adherence to, and their ability to model, the
fundamental values will become crucially important. The role they play will
be secondary to what they are. Their being will not be merged into the play-
er on the stage, playing one part after the other at the bidding of admini-
strative superiors; rather will their role become more an integral part of their
being. The virtue of truth will replace therapeutics; courage will replace
public relations; justice will replace equal rights; humility, patience, and
integrity will replace self-concept; friendship will replace group interaction;
and effective and professional teaching (based on personal responsibility for
changes brought about in children) will replace providing opportunities for
active learning.
Principals will not be trained in the latest futuristic management skills,
but will be selected on the basis of proven wise judgment, education, and
moral integrity. Consultation will not be a charade to get people involved,
or to empower teachers, or to give them ownership, but will be a genuine
and open device to obtain advice and opinion. Change will not be con-
sidered inherently better than stability. There will be no optimism about the
inevitability of progress; good intentions will be little excuse for poor
performance. Improvement will be measured against consensual goals.
Administrators, teachers, and students will be encouraged to be themselves,
and to accept themselves, as persons equal in dignity, but different in
aptitudes, interests, personality, background, and family. Truth will be the
pervasive ethic. Students will not be exhorted to fulfil themselves, but they
will be stimulated to be open to life and its possibilities, to live full and
responsible lives. The principal will be responsible for a school of high but
realistic expectations for all and for a trusting environment based on shared
fundamental values.
Clearly, this school will not be acceptable to all, but neither is the public
school of today. It will reflect the wishes of many parents, not all either
Christian or traditionalist. There is no obvious justification for the imposi-
tion of secular emotivism on unwilling parents. The MacIntyre school would
be one of choice; there is no reason to believe it would be less popular than
the progressive school believed in by educational experts—despite the
latter’s demonstrable lack of success (or interest) in academics and character.
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Although the MacIntyre school would serve genuine functional or values
communities and would have a clear doctrine, it would by no means entail
the loss of individuality. One of the glories of the western cultural tradition
has been its ability to combine a strong sense of community with respect for
individual integrity; this combination is expressed in the Christian tenet that
it is not enough to be good, but that one must choose the good. Personal
responsibility and individual uniqueness in a consensual community would
be stressed as integral parts of the classical and Judaeo-Christian, western
tradition.
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